Learning from the Mars Rover Mission: Scientific Discovery, Learning and Memory by Linde, Charlotte
Source of Acquisition 
NASA Ames Research Center 
LEARNING FROM THE MARS ROVER MISSION: 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, LEARNING AND MEMORY 
Charlotte Linde 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose 
Knowledge management for space exploration is part of a multi-generational effort. Each 
mission builds on knowledge from pnor missions, and learning is the fxst step in knowledge 
production. Ths paper uses the Mars Exploration Rover rmssion as a site to explore t h s  
process. 
Approach 
Observational study and analysis of the work of the MER science and engineering team 
during rover operations, to investigate how learmng occurs, how it is recorded, and how these 
representations might be made available for subsequent missions. 
Findings 
Learning occurred in many areas: plannmg science strategy, using instruments within the 
constramts of the martian environment, the Deep Space Network, and the mission 
requirements; usmg software tools effectively; and runrung two teams on Mars tune for three 
months. This learning is preserved in many ways. Prmarily it resides m individual’s 
memories. It is also encoded m stories, procedures, programming sequences, published 
reports, and lessons learned databases. 
Research implications 
Shows the earliest stages of knowledge creation m a scientific mission, and demonstrates that 
knowledge management must begin with an understanding of knowledge creation. 
Practical implications 
Shows that studymg learmng and knowledge creation suggests proactive ways to capture and 
use knowledge across multiple missions and generations. 
Value 
This paper provides a m q u e  analysis of the learning process of a scientific space mission, 
relevant for knowledge management researchers and designers, as well as demonstratmg m 
detail how new learning occurs in a l e m g  orgamzation. 
This paper descnbes an aspect of knowledge management that is rarely discussed. the creahon 
of new scientific, technical and orgamzational knowledge as part of an exploration mission, 
and the distribution of that howledge within and across institutional boundaries. Knowledge 
management for space projects and institutions shares many of the same challenges as 
knowledge management for any other complex endeavor Personnel must be trained, policies 
must be implemented and documented, records and documents must be areated and stored. 
However, a scientific mssion into space has several properties that add additional complexity 
to knowledge management requirements. First, the enhre motivahon for the mission is to 
develop new scientific knowledge. This knowledge results from learning by individuals, 
groups, and institutions. Much of the literature on institutional learning has focused on 
learmng in the service of fundamental corporate goals, rather than on situations where the 10 
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development of new knowledge is itself the goal. (See, for example, (Davenport and Prusak, 
1988), chapter 3.) 
An addihonal complexity is that space mssions are commonly a collaboration between 
multiple institutions. In the case of the MER mssion described here, the team included 
members from at least five NASA centers, with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory as the lead, as 
well as over 37 universities, institutes, and pnvate corporations. This means that recogmzing, 
preserving, organizing and disseminating new knowledge can not be confined within the 
boundaries of a single orgamzation. 
The most familiar form of knowledge captured in space knowledge management efforts is 
represented in the form of documents generated as part of the ongoing process of a mission: 
design documents, records of mssion reviews, records generated dunng the mssion, etc. 
However, there is also a great deal of retrospective activity attempts to recognize and 
preserve learning at the end of the project, or even more challenging, years later, from reonng 
experts. These post-project capture efforts most often consist of requirements for personnel to 
fill out computer-based forms in Lessons Learned systems and to deposit mandated records 
when departing. Somewhat less frequently, there is an attempt to capture learning by an 
interview process which results in written summaries or video records of stories told by 
departing experts. 
In order for such efforts to result in useful knowledge consistently and effectively, it is 
important to ask what learning is in the context of space exploration, and how to recognize it. 
While so-called Lessons Learned databases are common, their underlying definition of a 
lesson is frequently not clearly specified. Most often, a lesson is taken to be the product of a 
mistake or a mshap: something which must be documented to assure that it will not happen 
again. Many such “lessons” are to be found in mishap reports by investigation boards, and 
many reporting databases have as their primary purpose the collection of data to be provided 
to such a board in case of a mishap. This is a negative view of learning as an unpleasant 
achvity, as expressed in the colloquial phrase: “Have you learned your lesson yet?’ This 
means that much more attention is paid to failed projects than to successful ones 
(MacCormack, 2004). 
Yet in spite of mishaps at worst and reinventions of the wheel at best, much new and positive 
leamng does occur As NASA prepares for a return to the moon after thirty years, more IS 
known now, both techicaiiy and insntuuonaily Thus, rather than merely €omsing on lessons 
learned in the narrow sense of documenting mistakes, there is a more inspiring question. how 
do people, projects, and institutions learn new things, how is this learning preserved and 
continued, and how is it possible to plan for such learning and preservaoon across 
multigenerational missions? 
There are many types of learning in projects as large, complex, and lengthy as space 
exploration mssions. At the highest level, there is mission-scale learning. This includes such 
issues as how to maintain support for a mssion over many years, multiple elections, and 
changes of government commitments to the mission, and how to manage across changes in 
the requirements for how a government agency is legally mandated to work with contractors, 
and in the mandated system for management processes. (For example, (Johnson, 2002) 
describes changes in systems engineering models in Amepcan and European space programs.) 
At perhaps the most detailed level, there is learning about indindual components and their 
behavior The behavior of the Space Shuttle’s O-ring at low temperatures is perhaps the most 
notorious example, but any spacecraft design incorporates hundreds of thousands of such 
lessons learned about components and their interactions. At an intermediate level, there is the 
learning generated in the design process: inheritance of previous mssion design concepts; 
development of new designs, matenals, and processes; discovery by iterative design, etc. 
In order to describe what learmng looks like as it happens, this paper focuses on an 
intermediate level of learning that falls between the level of government policy and the level 
of widgets, loolung at ongoing learning during mission operations, and the ways in which t h s  
learning is formally or informally incorporated into the memory of the institution performing 
the mission, It is difficult to capture or even recognize this kind of learning without special 
efforts. It may become part of the mandated or informal work procedures, incorporated into 
software code, or may simply become what “everybody knows. ” By the end of a mission, it is 
easy to forget that learning has taken place, since it has become obvious “common sense. ” 
Some learning may be captured but stored in disparate places so that it would be very difficult 
to reconstitute. Finally, without the intenhon and ability to recognize learning on the fly as 
learning, there is no reason to try to capture it systematically 
This paper first descnbes what such learning looks like, describes how such learning is 
currently captured (or not), and finally, discusses methods for discovenng, capturing, and 
representing these more subtle forms of learning. In effect, the paper shows ernpincal 
examples of a few of the many types of learning processes which produce the data and 
information which knowledge management systems attempt to manage. 
RESEARCH SITE AND METHODS 
This paper is based on a study of the Mars Exploration Rover mission. At the time of writing 
(August 2005), the mission still continues, with both rovers in operation approximately 18 
months after the mssion’s nominal duration. 
NASA’s Mars Exploration Rover Project consists of two rovers perfarming robohc geological 
fieldwork on two locahons on the surface of Mars, searching for evidence of a history of past 
water activity The first rover, Spint, landed on Mars on January 4,2004, followed by the 
landing of the second rover, Opportunity, on January 25,2004. The rovers were designed to 
recognize and maneuver around small obstacles on their way to observe features selected by 
scientists from images sent by the rovers. They carry an instrument package which includes a 
panoramic camera (Pancam), a stereo camera with 1 i coior filters and 2 filters for imaging 
the Sun, a mniature Thermal Emission Spectrometer (Mini-TES); a robotic arm with a 
microscopic imager to produce extreme close-up images of rocks, soils and particles; an 
alpha-particle spectrometer to detect elemental abundances of rocks and soils; a Mossbauer 
spectrometer to distinguish iron-bearing minerals; and a Rock Abrasion Tool (RAT) for 
brushmg and grinding. Additionally, the rovers contain two monochromahc navigation 
cameras, four hazard avoidance cameras, and high and low gain antennae for data transfer to 
Earth. 
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The Rover's Instruments 
In a#dition to returning unprecedented data about Mars, the M R  mission also has provided 
us Tith an opportunity to track how the science and engineering team learned, how ths  
learning was recorded, or assimilated without specifically being marked as learning, and 
whether the representations of this learning are likely to be usefully available for subsequent 
mssions. This paper is based on an observational study of the work of the MER science and 
engineering teams during the first six months of the mssion, the most intensive period for 
these teams. Conducted by members of NASA Ames Research Center Work System Design 
and Evaluation team, the study included ethnographic observabon, video and audio recording 
of t€ie work of the science team, analysis of documents and technology use, and interviews 
with team members. 
Grossly simplified, the work of the science operations team during the initial penod consisted 
of receiving downlinked data from one of the rovers, assembling it into usable data products, 
analyzing it to determine what data to request next, planning the rover's activities on the next 
sol (martian day), and creating command sequences to uplink to the rover (See also (Wales 
et aj., 2005) for a fuller discussion of the work of t h~s  team.) 
(0 Jay Tnmble, NASA Ames Research Center) ' 
Operations Communications Model 
The 'science team was divided into five theme groups by scienldic discipline: Atmospheric 
Sciepces, Geology; Soils and Physical Properties, G'eochemistry/Mineralogy; and Long Term 
PlaQning. Long Term Planning is a special group charged with developing a general plan for 
eacy sol, and ensuring continuity between sols, and tracking the progress of science and 
mission objectives. Discussion, learning, negotiation, and planning occurred in a series of 
forqal meetmgs, punctuated by individual or ad hoc small group work. 
TYPp OF LEARNING 
There were many forms of learning and learning capture observed during the work of the 
science and operations team. Indeed, th~s  paper describes a work in progress, since at the time 
of lriting the mission still continues, over a year longer than the normnal90 day duration of 
each rover’s mission. Further, although several issues of Sczence have already appeared with 
initial findings from the Rovers, much of the work of scientific analysis, and assessment of 
design and operations decisions can be per€ormed only after the conclusion of the mission. 
However, even before the end of the mission, it is possible to sketch some of the major areas 
of lqarning and knowledge preservation. 
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Le$ning the Instruments 
A m’ajor type of learning we observed was the team coming to understand the potentials and 
limits of the instruments of the rover, and how to work with them to obtain the desired science 
return. The team had to strike a balance between the scientific desire for as many 
observations as possible, made at the highest resolution possible, and the practical restrictions 
impbsed by available rover battery power, and bandwidth for downlink on the Deep Space 
Network (the “space internet” consistmg of satellites orbiting Mars as well as three radio 
telescopes on Earth), which must transmit the data of many mssions. 
Let us consider in detail one example of many, observed three weeks after landing, a point in 
the qnission when much new learning was happening. In an informal meeting, a group of 
scientists discussed possibilities of compressing data from the Microscopic Imager to 
oveccome a potential downlink problem of too high a data volume for uncompressed images. 
The !options were either to reduce the number of bits per pixel or to take fewer observations, 
or some combination of these strategies. The discussion included experhse offered by the 
writer of the data compression algorithm, who said that “One bit per pixel is far from 
adequate” while three bits cannot be distinguished from lossless compression. One of the 
sciehtists showed the results of a rapid experiment he has performed in the last twenty 
minutes, producing images at a low pixel rate. The chair of the Long Term Planning Theme 
Group suggested a compromise, and an immediate decision was made that a rate of three bits 
per Rixel with five rather than seven siices was adequate for the current task, but that the - 
decibion might be revisited for observabons on different soil. 
I 
Thiq is an example of practical learning on the spot: learning how to use an instrument in new 
conditions within the changing constraints of the situation. It becomes an immediate part of 
the ‘earn’s knowledge: a certain compression rate for this instrument will be adequate for 
certain scienbfic purposes, and thus can relieve some of the pressure of the volume of data to 
be dbwnlinked. 
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The jquesbon may be raised: why call this learning? Isn’t it a normal part of the scientific 
discbvery process? There is certamly a great deal of overlap between the terms “discovery” 
and /‘learning” in science. However, it seems valuable to reserve the term “dwovery” for 
scientific results: i.e. the MER mssion has discovered evidence of the past existence of liquld 
wat4r on Mars. “Learning” then can be used to describe the ongoing work of scientists as 
the$ develop the tools, skills and experience to make discoveries. 
i 
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Hoq is such l e m n g  captured or represented? Consider the following quote from a report on 
the fdicroscopic Imager in Science (Kerkenhoff et al, 2004) 
! 
I 
A typical MI data set includes a stack of three, five, or seven MI images, acquired at 3- 
mm steps along the MI optical axis with the dust cover open. This acquisition 
approach helped to ensure optimum focus on targets with relief greater the MI depth of 
field. The number of images in an MI stack was kept small to mnimze the volume of 
extraneous MI data returned to earth. Most of the MI stacks included at least one 
image in good focus, but uncertamhes in the front Hazcam terrain model resulted in 
poorly focused MI images in some cases. Color information was somebmes added by 
acquinng an additional single-frame MI image of the same target at the nominal best- 
focus position with the dust cover closed. Some of the MI targets were imaged with a 
binocular stereo pair of leftlright MI stacks or even a mosaic of MI stacks. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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This dense paragraph reports tersely the result of hundreds of discovenes of how best to use 
the instrument, each of which was the result of discussions like the example above. Indeed, as 
the mission continues with degradation of the rovers’ condihon and progressive loss of battery 
powpr, further learning is taking place about how to use the instruments under extreme 
conditions, including maneuvers which would not have been even attempted during the initial 
period of the mssion, for fear of damaging the rovers. Without the observation of the actual 
work of the team, it would be hard to retneve from this archival record the social activity of 
the liearning which produced it, or even the specifics of each decision 
Learning the Limits of the Models 
A dajor part of the daily tactical planning process involved scientists individually, in small 
groups, and in the formal science team meeting of the day, using a software tool called 
Scie’nce Activity Planner (SAP). This tool allows the scientists to specify the observations 
needed to produce a required observation (and its resulting data product), and provides 
estimates of the amount of tine and power that any given observation would require. It thus 
allo-ked scientists to agree on the activities that would be requested on a given day 
Thus, €or example, if the scientists were considenng a dnve of a given number of meters, 
folldwed by pictures to be taken by specified cameras, SAP could show an esbmate of the 
tim4 it would take to dnve to the spot, as well as the amount of power available after the 
drivb. However, these estimates were quite rough. Over time, scienksts learned that they - 
coul(l produce plans with power requirements well over the 100% available power level 
indihated by SAP 
Similarly, odometer figures used for rover location were quite inaccurate, and required 
comjpensatory calculations. For example, in a discussion about the strategy for the coming sol, 
a scjentist reminded the group of previous problems with odometry which might compromise 
the Qurrent plan: 
1 
‘‘ViJe may have a situation like we did with Faux Trench that our pointing is compromsed 
by the terram in front. We drove away from Faux Trench with the hope of turning around 
anh shooting it. And we missed wildly because the odometry apparently was wildly wrong. 
And we may be in a condition like that again. So my pQint here is that MiniTES on those 
robks will probably be a bit dicier than it has been in previous times.” 
i 
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Thid example shows the group in the process of learnlng what activities are possible: a 
proqosed plan is critiqued because the requested images require knowing the precise location 
of +e rover, not possible given the inaccuracy of odometry in the soil of the pamcular 
locabon. Some of the problem of calibrating the odometry were discussed in the first 
pub$cations of mission, results. A discussion of how the exact path of the rover was 
determined includes the note: “Results indicate that the total length of the rover traverse 
during the 90-sol primary mssion was 637 m as measured by wheel odometry, 506 m as 
asse’ sed from formal localization performed for the locations where image data were 
acq I ,ired” ((Squyres and al., 2004), p. 205.) 
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In gbneral, experience allowed the scientists to move from the more conservative eshmates 
prodided by the models to increasingly generous estimates in their planning. This kind of 
learning, however, raises a real question for knowledge management. We do not know 
wheber the SAP software will be carried over for use in future rover missions. If it is, we 
musk ask what mechanisms should be in place to collect the learning about the accuracy of the 
model’s predictions, so that the next version can benefit from this learning. The issue is even 
mork difficult if another modeling program is developed. how can knowledge of the rover’s 
actuhI behavior under various conditions be preserved for incorporation into the next 
generation of models? 
Strategic Planning 
0ne;important development, which made the mission so fruitful, was that the science and 
engipeering teams learned to do long term strategic planning, rather than planning one sol at a 
timcj. Obviously, the mssion had overall strategic goals, both scientific goals (“follow the 
water”), and mission goals (90 sols of operation, 600 meters driven, etc.). However, the 
challenge for the team was to bridge between these very high level goals and the intense time 
pressure of daily operabons. Initially, during the field tests on Earth, which served as training 
bot6 in how to run the rover and how to perform mission operations, scientists tended to plan 
one sol at a time. However, as they grew more famliar with the planning process, even in the 
field tests and certainly during the actual mission, they became increasingly adroit at 
producing multi-sol and even multi-week plans which included complex branching 
posdibilities depending on what was discovered each sol Strategic planning involved 
learhng how to negotiate a number of tensions: the requirements of different science theme 
gro Jps, the “bird in the hand’ problem”, and the development of strategies for producing 
mu$-soi pians with software designed for single-sol planning. 
Coqpetition and collaboration among theme groups: The inihal model during the field 
test$ was that the different theme groups would work separately to develop their desired plan 
for the next sol and then would negotiate the final plan dunng meetings of all the groups. 
Hoyever, as the theme groups grew more familiar with the instruments and the process, they 
began informal collaborations immediately, working both with intellectually adjoining 
grodps, and with the long term planning group, which served as the custodian of strategic 
aim(. This allowed for the early development of branching plans that ensured that the 
differing data requirements of the Theme Groups would be obtained withm several sols, if not 
in a biven sol. 
Ad tionally, an informal process of monitoring fairness dpveloped. Members of all the 
Theme Groups notxed situaaons in which the observabons requested by a given Theme 
Grohp had not been accepted for severai sols, and attempted to ensure that those observations 
I 
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wer6 made within a reasonable time. (This was a particular issue for the Atmosphere Theme 
Group, since its desired observahons of sky or honzon were not as dependent on specific 
loca~ons, and hence on performance on a particular sol, as were those of other theme groups, 
whi+h required observations of specific rocks or soils.) Interestingly, there were occasions 
wher members of one Theme Group pointed out that another group’s requested observations 
had peen postponed for many sols, and that fairness required their requests be given priority 
i 
“B’ id in the hand problem”: There was a constant tension for scientists between taking as 
man, observations as possible of the location they were in, as opposed to moving on to more 
obvi;lously interesting locations, The problem, obviously, was that while some locations were 
ly to be more geologically significant than others, so little is known about Mars that 
eve& locahon has its charms and possibilihes, The tension was heightened by the fact that 
the iavers had a limited but unknown duration of operation. This was, of course, more of an 
issub early in the mission, when everything was new It became the task of the chair of the 
science team (a posihon which rotated daily or nearly daily) to arbitrate these arguments. 
Strategies for multi-sol planning: One problem which the team faced was that the computer 
toolk for science activity planning were designed to handle only a single sol. It was not 
posdible to automatically carry over requested observations to the next sol such bookkeeping 
wasjhmdled by human memory The ability to handle multi-sol planning, as well as the 
tension between strategic and tactical aims (the “bird in the hand problem”, was assisted by 
sevcjral developments. One was Sol Tree, a representation of alternative multi-sol plans 
developed by the Long Term Planning Group, and usually publicly visible on the large 
mor@or of a collaborative work tool called the MERBoard. It was extensively used by the 
sciehtists in their planning, but did not connect to the representations provided by the Science 
Actibity Planner 
Anither way of handling the complexities of planning was the development of standard 
stra+gies and names for them. This is a well known cognitive strategy chunking - grouping 
objects or actions into a newly defined entity, and lexicalization - development of new names 
for 4ese entities. An enormous amount of learning is encoded in these names, and provide a 
likdy mechamsm for the preservation of this knowledge across missions. Some examples 
’$ 
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At the highest level are names descnbing multi-sol strategies which have become 
conqentionaiized. For example, iate in the mission, the team deveioped a ‘iiiy pad strategy“ a 
plan/ for moving the rover from one to another north-facing location in order to take advantage 
of available solar power, as the advent of the martian winter brought shorter daylight penods, 
wi ‘ the Sun in the north. 
At ,6e next level down are names for sol types. For example, the ‘touch-and-go’ sol, which 
was jfeatured in descnphon of the mssion in the first special issue of Science devoted to Spirit 
at Gbsev Crater (Rowan, 2004) “Spirit drove about 600 meters from the* Columbia Memorial 
Staqon to the nm of Bonneville Crater Along the way, the rover performed quick analyses, 
call4d touch-and-go operations, in which the instruments on the arm touched and analyzed a 
f e a v  but no brushing or gnnding was done. 
nauqcal exploration by large sailing vessels, when ‘touch and go’ is thought to have 
ongnated to describe a ship’s keel touchmg the seafloor wefly but not getting stuck.” 
I 
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Exploration has changed since the era of 
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At a: lower level is the combination of several activities, which may be performed during a 
sing!e sol These include the ‘drive-by’ - driving past a specific target and photographing it , 
the Iscoot and shoot’ - a series of drive-bys , a ‘scratch and sniff - drilling into a rock and 
then!exmning it with the rover’s other instruments , the ‘stutter stop’ - stopping a drive one 
meter before the planned end, taking images, and then continuing to the desbnabon. The team 
alsoideveloped terms for types of images, types of features, data downlink issues, and 
stanbard strategies for using the science planning software. 
Leaping How to Learn 
All bf these are examples not only of learning the specific technical strategies and solubons, 
but $lso of learning how to learn as a team, under strict constraints of time, available power, 
tran,#mssible data volume, and negotiated group demands and strategies. The examples cited 
here1 show the learning happening in small groups, taking advantage of the co-presence of 
tear$ members. That is, the experts needed for consultation were either present, or available 
by phone (since presumably the team members working on a given rover were operating on 
the sleep schedule of that rover’s time zone.) Team members thus can know who the experts 
are on particular instruments, software, etc., and can bnng them in smoothly to contribute 
theit expertise. Additionally, members of the science and engineering teams moved between 
rovdrs, depending on personal schedule issues and scienhfic interests. Such movement 
allowed for learning to be transmitted almost immediately from one rover team to another 
Thid poses an important question for the design of mission operations for future rmssions. For 
example, the MSL ’09 rover mission has an expected duration of three years, which clearly 
prechdes operation on Mars time, and which requires that participants from institutions other 
thaq JPL be able to work at their home institutions. Planning for this kind of learning, and for 
its dssermnabon across multiple institubons, nations, and continents requires first recognizing 
the yalue of these informal, on-the-fly collaborabons, and then working seriously on the 
design of technology for remote collaboration that can allow for analogues or substitutes. 
P 
PREbXRrnG (OR LOSING) L x m G  
Thus far, this paper has attempted to sketch some of the many types of learning which happen 
as a$ unremarked part of the daily work of a mission, Obviously, the work of the MER 
science and engineering teams is anything but routine: team members are creatively 
perf‘ rming new and startlingly complex and successful activities in an unexplored terrain on 
an0 t i  I er pianet. Certain exampies of the team’s learning were obvious to the entire world: - 
early loss of data from the rover due to a software problem with flash memory and its 
sucdessful repair was the stuff of news headlines and ongoing drama 
(h~:Nllis.nasa.gov/llis/plls/index.html). But most of the leamng discussed here is not 
drahatic. Rather it is daily, ongoing, incremental. The question for knowledge management 
is hdw to recognize this as learning, and ensure that it is preserved. 
If knowledge management begins to view knowledge as the product of Teaming, it is 
neckssary to ask: ‘Who learns?’ Certainly, rndividuals learn, and as they move from project to 
projbct or mission to mission, there is a good chance that their learning will be available on 
the iext project. Individuals also train and mentor their colleagues and juniors, providing 
ano&er way that individual learning is transmitted. 
But Fhat would it mean for an institution to learn? Whether it is legitimate to use the terms 
“leai-ning” and “remembering for institutions has been the subject of a fair amount of debate 
1 
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(Wdsh and Ungson, 1991). Certainly they make efforts to preserve aspects of what has 
hapqaned in the past, to find and retrieve some of these representations of the past, and to use 
in the present to influence the future. This is done in a variety of ways, ranging from 
relying on individual human memory and transmssion from human to human, 
through archival and computer storage of documents and data, to orgaruzational policies and 
proqedures and even physical infrastructure. This list is similar to the “bins” of memory 
prodosed in (Walsh and Ungson, 199 1): individuals; culture; transformations, which incIudes 
traiding of recruits, standard operating procedures, budgeting, marketing, administrative 
systems, etc., structures, which include both individual roles within an organization and 
“institutionalized myths that are sustained and legitimzed by members of an organization” (p. 
66);/and ecology, physical structure and design. 
Insljtutions learn by retaining people who have learned, and by engaging them to train others. 
In a ;weak sense, it could be argued that an institution has learned by collecting relevant data 
and :making it available as knowledge in archives, databases, etc. However, this constitutes 
actukl learning only if the knowledge is both usable and used. In the strongest sense, an 
inst$ution has learned when its behavior has changed. Learning has occurred when it has 
been incorporated into the procedures mandated by the institubon, into the design decisions 
the ihstitution makes, and into the ways in which the institution funcbons internally md with 
extei-nal partners. 
i 
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Let us now consider strategies for ensuring that learning is preserved as knowledge, at the 
individual, team, institutional and scienhfic levels. 
Preserving Individual Learning 
AltQough this secbon discusses individual learning, it must be stressed that in fact no learning 
can be purely individual, with no contribution to or from other people and groups. This may 
be appear to be a ndiculous claim in the case of a mathematics student simng alone in a room 
wit& a textbook (but how was the textbook produced?) (Brown and Duguid, 2000). In the 
casei of the MER mission, though, the work is so massively collaborative, depending on the 
con@butions of so many different parkipants, that learning obviously must be collaborative. 
At t$e same bme, particular people do learn, and certain types of learning are carried only by 
peoele, with little or no contnbution from documentabon. There are a number of ways for 
institutions to preserve this learning: career track planning, mentonng, succession planning. 
etc..l 
The ]career tracks of individuals can make a large difference in whether their learning is 
presbrved for the larger institution. Presumably many of the JPL employees who worked on 
the MER mssion will move on to later Mars missions, thus ensuring that what they have 
leaded is avilable for these missions. Opportunities for mentoring were present dunng the 
MER mission in a number of ways. Senior team members, who had wokked on Viking and 
Pat&nder, NASA’s previous Mars lander mssions, were part of the team, many of them in 
role; that gave them responsibility for the strategic plamng of the mission. Many of the 
youhger science team members were graduate students of the academc co-invesbgators: 
agaib, a form of mentoring built into the structure of graduate education. They will be well 
positioned to become investigators for future missions. €$owever, in retrospective 
assissments of the mission, one question worth asking would be whether there were sufficient 
I 
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opp4rtunities and time for effective mentoring to take place at every level of the team 
stru4ture. 
Some. individuals take steps to preserve their individual learning by publishing accounts of 
their experiences (Mishkin, 2003), (Slurley, 1998), (Sqyres, 2005) However tfus is a 
strategy that appears to be available only to fairly high level scientists and managers, and 
usu&y for accounts of successful mssions. 
Preserving Group Learning 
One: of the most important types of learning that happened during the mission was that the 
manly people on the MER team, comng from many different institutions, disciplines, and 
effektive team. Obviously, the entire team will not work together on the next major Mars 
mskon. However, some key people certainly will partrcipate in this mission and will 
conebute some of this learning about effective teaming. 
A particularly impressive example of this type of learning is the way the various Science 
Theme Groups and engineering groups learned to work together, allowing the planning 
process to occur earlier and earlier in the sol A question for a retrospective assessment of the 
mission would be to determine how well the various groups understood the work of other 
grodps and the constraints on it, partrcularly groups which worked at different times in the 
cycle, and so did not have the opportunity to learn through face-to-face communications. 
The!work of learning how to operate on Mars time provides a very detailed example of group 
leariiing. Veterans of the Mars Pathfinder mission recalled the difficulties of working on Mars 
time;, and asked Human Factors experts at NASA Ames Research Center for assistance in 
mitikating the difficulties. A team began with a survey of Pathfinder personnel to detemune 
what factors of Mars bme operations were most difficult for them. Schedules, housing 
faci ,ities, and policies were devised to make this difficult operation as easy as possible. This 
is le@rning deep down in the details. Mundane but critical examples include providing short- 
ter rental apartments for visitmg scientists located in quiet neighborhoods near all-night 
duribg the day, providing on-site rooms with cots for “power naps”, developing a policy for 
reimbursing taxi expenses for team members who were too fatigued to drive home safely 
Preserving Institutional Learning 
Inst$utions learn when their members have learned. Thus, developing effective training is an 
impbrtant part of any institutional learning strategy However, in a more formal sense, 
insdhions have learned when they have developed policies, procedures and practices which 
incokporate the l e m n g  developed by individuals and groups. T h s  is a method which puts 
the iesponsibility for incorporating learning on the institution directly As shown by the 
Columbia Accident Invesbgafion Board Report (Gehman et al, 2003), it is not enough to 
ma$ate procedures. It is also necessary to have continued organizational attention to ensure 
that bese procedures are followed, and that they can be followed. The existence of 
conientionalized workarounds to institutional policies is not, as management mght be 
tem$ed to thmk, a testimony to human perversity Rather, it suggests that the institutional 
proqedures themselves may be impeding the workflow required, or that additional, 
unaqkngwledged environmental factors, such as production pressures, may make procedures 
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of experience, learned to work together under difficult conditions as an extraordinarily 
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mar 7 .ets, convincing the rental company to provide adequate blackout curtains to allow sleep 
I 
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diffibult or impossible to follow Additionally, the rapid tempo of a mssion like MER 
sug$ests a need for attention to the meta-process for producing procedures. Is it possible to 
incl$de new learning into mandated processes dunng the rmssion, or does the time required 
for .rialidation process for processes make this impossible? 
Scieh'tific and Public Learning 
I 
! 
It isjalso important to note that knowledge produced by such a mssion travels far beyond the 
peoele and the institutions which carry them out. Obviously, the MER mission has already 
resulted in scientific publicaaons, and the data of the rmssion will be a source of scientific 
analySes and publications for decades to come. The mission was unusual in choosing to make 
its raw data publicly available on its website as soon as possible. It also made detemned 
ef fok  at reaching the general public, with scienasts worlung in a sustamed way with press 
officers and science education experts to get new, engaging information out rapidly and 
cont$nuously 
1 
HOW BEST To PRESERVE KNOWLEDGE 
Let us conclude by considering how to implement strategies and tools for the preservation of 
knopledge at all these levels. First, this paper has argued that knowledge management should 
begi'p with an understanding that knowledge is the product of learning, individual and 
collqctive. Such a view provides a very different perspective for knowledge management than 
the common assumption that the beginning point for knowledge management is data, which is 
turned into interpreted information, and finally into usable knowledge. Tahng this view 
suggests an emphasis on identifying where learning is happening, and determining the best 
wayp to support and extend it within an institution, as well as preserving it for future uses. 
Lessons Learned Activities 
A common strategy to achieve institutional learning is to develop Lessons Learned databases 
for fiarticular missions or projects. This is often done by setting up a Lessons Learned 
to which project pzrticipants are requested or required to contribute relevant lessons, 
then validated before entry into the official database. At NASA, these Lessons 
re available both publicly and internally (1lis.nasa.gov). In general, a search of 
I 
lessps for both Pathfinder and MER missions shows a predominance of small scale technical 
issues. Additionaily, the format of the Lessons Learned form requires a description or" a * 
dnvjng event, a description of the lesson learned, and recommendations. This format 
encqurages recording problems rather than posihve learning. Further, the form is short, which 
precludes a detailed description of the kinds of learning and ways of learning descnbed above. 
In addition to the individual process of gathering Lessons Learned described above, there are 
alsoiLessons Learned workshops. These vary widely in format, and the variations make a 
great difference in the probable effectiveness of the product. The optinfal arrangement is to 
have/ the activity as part of a scheduled post-mission review, and ensure that the participants 
inclade.not only mission scientists and engineers, but also institutional decision makers who 
can berive immediate action items, and junior level employees, who can use the event as an 
opp&mity to learn in preparahon for later stages on their career tracks. Using a workshop as 
a way to populate a database is much less effective, althoygh probably still better than having 
indi$iduals fill out in the pnvacy of their own offices, since at least some discussion, 
I 
and cross-learning is possible. 
I 
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ve been a number of efforts at NASA to extract and record knowledge from senior or 
retidrig experts. This is a particular issue for mssions which may take generations to 
co41ete. These activities usually take the form of guided interviews, producing video tapes, 
raw :tknscripts, or edited versions of conversations. These efforts share the problem of all 
oral !history projects: the difficulty of effective indexing and formatting. There has been little 
research on the reuse of such products. Without a great deal of work after the knowledge 
captbre phase, what is produced is raw data, in a form likely to be unusable for anyone who 
musk come up to speed fast in a particular technical area. A number of technological 
solubons are being attempted in the area of automatic indexing of video records, and these 
ma+ alleviate some problems. However, thus far, research has shown that the most successful 
captjlre efforts of oral lessons learned involve a great deal of skilled wrihng and editing to 
make them useable (Linde, 2001). Further, it appears that it does not work to try to capture 
knodvledge first, and figure out how it will be used later Rather, it is necessary from the 
beg$nihg to design knowledge capture for its potential use and audience. 
I 
A r4cent way to capture knowledge is the development of web-based, interactive sites for 
posting and discussing lessons learned rapidly One of the more commonly referenced one is 
the Eureka system, developed at Xerox PARC to allow a community of copier technicians to 
sharp.and comment on tips for fixing equipment in the field (Bobrow and Whelan 2002). 
The war in Iraq has shown that the Center for Army Lessons Learned, often cited as a model 
of lessons learned produchon, is too slow to keep up with rapid unexpected developments. 
Field afficers have started web sites for shanng information as diverse as tips on field tactics, 
understanding Iraqi culture, dealing with suicidal soldiers, and even types of candy that don’t 
melf in desert heat. Initially unofficial, these sites have been migrated to official Army 
websites (Baum, 2005) 
Preparing to Capture Future Learning 
In aadition to refining methods for producing Lessons Learned databases, and capturing 
depaaing expertise, it is important for the field of knowledge management to develop other 
ways to accomplish knowledge capture as well, One suggestion would be for every major 
projkct to have a learning office or a learning officer, whose job it is to record successful 
leading as it happens. The MER mission did have a position called “documentarian” whose 
job was to record the events of each day However, this position tended to be filled by 
graduate students, whose iack of experience led them to record tacticai rather than strategic 
decisions. Someone holding such a position should be able to recognize and document 
posiiiye learnings as they occur 
In particular, as NASA prepares for the multi-decade, multi-generational explorahon of the 
Mo& and Mars, it IS necessary to make the best use and record of the learning that happens 
along the way Let us reflect on what we might want to learn from the Apollo lunar landing 
rms$ons. While a return to the moon will use very different technologies and procedures, 
there is still much that was learned during those missions that is still valid and important 35 
year? *later 
Firsi,we should distinguish between fields in whch there are major changes in the 
technology, for example, software design, versus those iq whch there is incremental 
p r o e s ,  such as thermal protection of spacecraft. We would hardly want to remember or use 
I 
I 
the qoftware used for the Apollo 11 mission in 1969. -~ 
I 
FligPt ,Director's console during the launch of the Apollo 11 lunar landing mission. 
In conkast, the root causes of some of the large scale problems of past missions involve 
manpgement, legal and political pressures which are still in force, and which might provide 
very valuable knowledge for new mssions. Finally there are constants. everything that we 
havq learned about how to operate under lunar gravity is still relevant for future mssions. 
i 
Leaning fi-om experience requires us both to recogmze l e m g  as it happens, and to 
distihgwsh those forms of immediate learning that can help us learn 111 the fhture. 
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